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Abstract
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where
a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation for a good
and seeks to maximize his cumulative discounted surplus. For this setting, first, we propose
a novel algorithm that never decreases offered prices and has a tight strategic regret bound in
Θ(log log T ) under some mild assumptions on the buyer surplus discounting. This result closes
the open research question on the existence of a no-regret horizon-independent weakly consistent
pricing. The proposed algorithm is inspired by our observation that a double decrease of offered
prices in a weakly consistent algorithm is enough to cause a linear regret. This motivates us to
construct a novel transformation that maps a right-consistent algorithm to a weakly consistent
one that never decreases offered prices.
Second, we outperform the previously known strategic regret upper bound of the algorithm
PRRFES, where the improvement is achieved by means of a finer constant factor C of the
principal term C log log T in this upper bound. Finally, we generalize results on strategic re-
gret previously known for geometric discounting of the buyer’s surplus to discounting of other
types, namely: the optimality of the pricing PRRFES to the case of geometrically concave de-
creasing discounting; and linear lower bound on the strategic regret of a wide range of horizon-
independent weakly consistent algorithms to the case of arbitrary discounts.
∗16, Leo Tolstoy St., Moscow, Russia, 119021 (www.yandex.com)
†Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics; GSP-1, 1 Leninskiye Gory, Main
Building, Moscow, Russia, 119991
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
05
10
1v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  8
 Fe
b 2
01
8
1 Introduction
Revenue maximization in online advertising represents one of the most important development
direction in leading Internet companies (such as real-time ad exchanges [26, 12], search engines [51,
3, 56, 27, 15], social networks [1], etc.), where a large part of advertisement inventory is sold via
widely applicable second price auctions [27, 37], including their generalizations as GSP [51, 36, 49,
15] and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [52, 53] auctions. Optimal revenue here is mostly controlled
by means of reserve prices, whose proper setting is studied both by game-theoretical methods [42, 33]
and by machine learning approaches [43, 14, 27, 5, 29, 37, 55, 49, 39, 38, 46, 48, 47, 22]. A large
number of online auctions run, for instance, by ad exchanges involve only a single bidder [5, 39, 22],
and, in this case, a second-price auction with reserve is equivalent to a posted-price auction [32]
where the seller sets a reserve price for a good (e.g., an ad space) and the buyer decides whether
to accept or reject this price (i.e., to bid above or below it).
In this work, we focus on a scenario when the seller repeatedly interacts through a posted-price
mechanism with the same strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks
to maximize his cumulative discounted surplus [5]. At each round of this game, the seller is able to
chose the price based on previous decisions of the buyer, i.e., to apply a deterministic online learning
(discrete) algorithm. The seller’s goal is to maximize his cumulative revenue over a finite number
of rounds T (the time horizon), which is generally reduced to regret minimization1, and the seller
seeks thus for a no-regret pricing algorithm, i.e., with a sublinear regret on T [5, 39, 6, 40, 17, 22].
For this setting, the algorithm PRRFES with tight strategic regret bound in Θ(log log T ) was
recently proposed for the case when the buyer’s cumulative surplus is geometrically discounted [22].
This algorithm is horizon-independent and right-consistent (i.e., it never proposes prices lower than
earlier accepted ones). However, its key peculiarity consists in its ability to decrease an offered price
after its rejection, but then to revise it and, moreover, to propose higher prices than this one in
subsequent rounds (not satisfying thus the left consistency), such a behavior of the algorithm may
be confusing to a buyer. Despite the fact that there does not exist a no-regret horizon-independent
algorithm with the fully consistent property (both right, and left), the question on the existence of
such algorithm with the consistent property in weak sense remains open [22].
The primary research goal of our study is, first, to find a no-regret weakly consistent pricing
algorithm and to resolve thus the open research question. Second, we are aimed to improve the
currently best known upper bounds on strategic regret2 and to generalize results on them to families
of buyer discount sequences that are wider than geometric ones.
We propose a novel algorithm that never decreases offered prices and can be applied against
strategic buyers with a tight regret bound in Θ(log log T ) under some mild assumptions on the
discounting of the buyer’s surplus (Th. 2). This result constitutes the first contribution of our work
and closes the open research question on the existence of a no-regret horizon-independent weakly
consistent pricing. The key idea of this algorithm is based on our observation that a double decrease
of offered prices by a weakly consistent algorithm is enough to cause a linear regret (Lemma 2). This
motivates us to propose a novel transformation that being applied to a right-consistent algorithm
results in a weakly consistent one which has no decrease of offered prices (Lemma 3).
The second contribution consists in a novel strategic regret upper bound for the algorithm
PRRFES which outperforms the previously known one from [22]. This is achieved through obtaining
a finer expression for the constant factor C of the principal term C log log T of this upper bound
that can be optimized by adjusting the algorithm’s parameter (Th. 1). Finally, our work contributes
1In our study, the regret is the difference between the revenue that would have been earned by offering the buyer’s
valuation and the seller’s revenue; it is optimized for the worst-case buyer valuation (see Sec. 2.1 and in [32, 39, 22]).
2Since these bounds are tight [22], we are aimed to improve the constant factor C of its principal term C log log T .
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also the generalization of the tight strategic regret bound of the pricing PRRFES to the case of
geometrically concave decreasing discounting of the buyer surplus (Th. 1) and the generalization
of the previously known linear lower bound on the strategic regret of a wide range of horizon-
independent weakly consistent algorithms to the case of arbitrary discounts (Lemma 2 and Cor. 1).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Setup of repeated posted-price auctions
We consider the following scenario of repeated posted-price auctions [5, 39, 22]. The seller repeatedly
proposes goods (e.g., advertisement spaces) to a single buyer over T rounds (the time horizon): one
good per round. The buyer holds a fixed private valuation v ∈ [0; +∞) for a good, i.e., the valuation
v is unknown to the seller and is equal for goods offered in all rounds. At each round t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
a price pt is offered by the seller, and an allocation decision at ∈ {0, 1} is made by the buyer: at = 1,
when the buyer accepts to buy a currently offered good at that price, 0, otherwise. Thus, the seller
applies a (pricing) algorithm A that sets prices {pt}Tt=1 in response to buyer decisions a = {at}Tt=1
referred to as a (buyer) strategy. We consider the deterministic online learning case when the price
pt at a round t ∈ {1, . . . , T} can depend only on the buyer’s actions during the previous rounds
a1:t−13. Following [22], we are studying algorithms that does not depend on the horizon T since
it is very natural in practice (e.g., of ad exchanges) that the seller does not know in advance the
number of rounds T that the buyer wants to interact with him. Let A be the set of such algorithms.
Hence, given an algorithmA ∈ A, a strategy a uniquely defines the corresponding price sequence
{pt}Tt=1. Hence, given a pricing algorithm A, a buyer strategy a = {at}Tt=1 uniquely defines the
corresponding price sequence {pt}Tt=1, which, in turn, determines the seller’s total revenue
∑T
t=1 atpt.
This revenue is usually compared to the revenue that would have been earned by offering the buyer’s
valuation v if it was known in advance to the seller [32, 5, 39, 22]. This leads to the definition of
the regret of the algorithm A that faced a buyer with the valuation v ∈ [0, 1] following the (buyer)
strategy a over T rounds as Reg(T,A, v,a) := ∑Tt=1(v − atpt).
Following a standard assumption in mechanism design that matches the practice in ad ex-
changes [39], the pricing algorithm A, used by the seller, is announced to the buyer in advance. In
this case, the buyer can act strategically against this algorithm: we assume that the buyer follows
the optimal strategy aOpt(T,A, v,γ) that maximizes the buyer’s γ-discounted surplus [5]:
Surγ(T,A, v,a) :=
T∑
t=1
γtat(v − pt),
i.e., aOpt(T,A, v,γ) := argmaxa Surγ(T,A, v,a), where γ = {γt}∞t=1 is the discount sequence, which
is assumed positive, γt > 0∀t∈N, with convergent sums,
∑∞
t=1 γt<∞. Thus, we define the strategic
regret of the algorithm A that faced a strategic buyer with valuation v ∈ [0, 1] over T rounds as
SReg(T,A, v,γ) := Reg(T,A, v,aOpt(T,A, v,γ)).
Hence, we consider a two-player non-zero sum repeated game with incomplete information and
unlimited supply, introduced by Amin et al. [5] and considered in [39, 22]: the buyer seeks to
maximize his surplus, while the seller’s objective is to minimize his strategic regret (i.e., maximize
his revenue). Note that only the buyer’s objective is discounted over time (not the seller’s one),
which is motivated by the observation that sellers are far more willing to wait for revenue than
buyers are willing to wait for goods in important real-world markets like online advertising [5, 39].
3We use a notation for a part of a strategy at1:t2 = {at}t2t=t1 .
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In our setting, following [32, 5, 6, 39, 40, 22], we are interested in algorithms that attain o(T )
strategic regret (i.e., the averaged regret goes to zero as T → ∞) for the worst-case valuation
v ∈ [0, 1], i.e., we say that an algorithm A is no-regret when supv∈[0,1] Reg(T,A, v,aOpt) = o(T ).
Namely, we seek for algorithms that have the lowest possible strategic regret upper bound of the
form O(f(T )) and treat their optimality in terms of f(T ) with the slowest growth as T →∞ (the
averaged regret has thus the best rate of convergence to zero).
2.2 Notations and auxiliary definitions
Similarly to [22], a deterministic pricing algorithm A can be associated with an infinite complete
binary tree T(A) [32, 39] (since we consider horizon-independent algorithms). Each node n ∈ T(A)4
is labeled with the price pn offered by A. The right and left children of n are denoted by r(n) and
l(n) respectively. The left (right) subtrees rooted at the node l(n) (r(n) resp.) are denoted by L(n)
(R(n) resp.). The operators l(·) and r(·) sequentially applied s times to a node n are denoted by
ls(n) and rs(n) respectively, s ∈ N. The root node of a tree T is denoted by e(T).
So, the algorithm’s work flow is following: it starts at the root e(T(A)) of the tree T(A) by
offering the first price pe(T(A)) to the buyer; at each step t < T , if a price pn, n ∈ T(A), is accepted,
the algorithm moves to the right node r(n) and offers the price pr(n); in the case of the rejection,
it moves to the left node l(n) and offers the price pl(n); this process repeats until reaching the time
horizon T . The pseudo-code of this process is in Alg. C.1. The round at which the price of a node
n ∈ T(A) is offered is denoted by tn (it is equal to the node’s depth +1). Note that each node
n ∈ T(A) uniquely determines the buyer decisions up to the round tn−1. Thus, each buyer strategy
a1:t is bijectively mapped to a t-length path in the tree T(A) that starts from the root and goes to
a t-depth node (and the strategy prices are the ones that are in the nodes lying along this path).
We define, for a pricing tree T, the set of its prices ℘(T) := {pn | n ∈ T} and denote by
℘(A) := ℘(T(A)) all prices that can be offered by an algorithm A. We say that two infinite
complete trees T1 and T2 are price equivalent (and write T1 ∼= T2) if the trees have the same
node labeling when we naturally match the nodes between the trees (starting from the roots): i.e.,
following the same strategy in both trees, the buyer receives the same sequence of prices.
2.3 Background on pricing algorithms
First of all, we remind several classes (sets) of algorithms that were introduced in [39, 22] and
include the definitions of pricing consistency of different type, which are actively used in our work.
After that, we briefly overview pricing algorithms from existing studies [32, 5, 39, 22].
Notion of consistency. Since the buyer holds a fixed valuation, we could expect that a smart
online pricing algorithm should work as follows: after an acceptance (a rejection), it should set only
no lower (no higher, resp.) prices than the offered one. Formally, this leads to the definition:
Definition 1. An algorithm A is said to be consistent [39] (A in the class C) if, for any node
n ∈ T(A), pm ≥ pn ∀m ∈ R(n) and pm ≤ pn ∀m ∈ L(n).
The key idea behind a consistent algorithm A is clear [22]: it explores the valuation domain [0, 1]
by means of a feasible search interval [q, q′] (initialized by [0, 1]) targeted to locate the valuation
v. At each round t, A offers a price pt ∈ [q, q′] and, depending on the buyer’s decision, reduces
the interval to the right subinterval [pt, q
′] (by q := pt) or the left one [q, pt] (by q′ := pt); at any
moment, q is thus always the last accepted price or 0, while q′ is the last rejected price or 1. The
most famous example of a consistent algorithm is the binary search.
4For simplicity, if n is a node of a tree T, we write n ∈ T.
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Definition 2. An algorithm A is said to be weakly consistent [22] (A in the class WC) if, for any
node n ∈ T(A), (a) when r(n) s.t. pr(n) 6= pn, pm ≥ pn ∀m ∈ R(n); and, (b) when l(n) s.t. pl(n) 6= pn,
pm ≤ pn ∀m ∈ L(n).
Weakly consistent algorithms are similar to consistent ones, but they are additionally able to
offer the same price p several times before making a final decision on which of the subintervals [q, p]
or [p, q′] continue. The subclass of WC algorithms that can also wait with the subinterval decision,
but the pricing will be the same no matter when a decision is made, is the following.
Definition 3. A weakly consistent algorithm A is said to be regular [22] (A in the class RWC)
if, for any node n ∈ T(A):
• when pl(n) = pn = pr(n), [pm = pn ∀m ∈ R(l(n)) ∪ L(r(n))] or [L(n) ∼= R(n)];
• when pl(n) = pn 6= pr(n), [pm = pn ∀m ∈ R(l(n))] or [R(l(n)) ∼= R(n)];
• when pl(n) 6= pn = pr(n), [pm = pn ∀m ∈ L(r(n))] or [L(r(n)) ∼= L(n)].
Definition 4. An algorithm A is said to be right-consistent [22] (A in the class CR) if, for any
n ∈ T(A), pm ≥ pn ∀m ∈ R(n).
Right-consistent algorithms never offer a price lower than the last accepted one, but may offer
a price higher than a rejected one (in contrast to consistent algorithms). These classes are related
to each other in the following way: C ⊂ RWC ⊂WC and C ⊂ CR.
We will use the following definitions [22] as well. A buyer strategy a is said to be locally non-
losing w.r.t. v and A if prices higher than v are never accepted5 (i.e., at = 1 implies pt ≤ v). An
algorithm A is said to be dense if the set of its prices ℘(A) is dense in [0, 1] (i.e., ℘(A) = [0, 1]).
Background. The consistency represents a quite reasonable property, when the buyer is myopic
(truthful, i.e., at = 1 ⇔ pt ≤ v), because a reported buyer decision correctly locates v in [0, 1].
Kleinberg et al. [32] showed that the regret of any pricing algorithm against a myopic buyer is lower
bounded by Ω(log log T ) and proposed a horizon-dependent consistent algorithm, known as Fast
Search (FS ), that has tight regret bound in Θ(log log T ) against such buyers.
A strategic buyer, incited by surplus maximization, may mislead the seller’s consistent algo-
rithm [6, 39]. To overcome this, Mohri et al. [39] proposed to inject so-called penalization rounds
(see Def. 5) after each rejection into the algorithm FS and got, in this way, the algorithm PFS with
strategic regret bound in O(log T log log T ) that outperforms the algorithm “Monotone” [5] with
strategic regret bound in O(T 1/2). Both algorithms are horizon-dependent and are not optimal.
Definition 5. Nodes n1, . . . , nr ∈ T(A) are said to be a (r-length) penalization sequence[39, 22] if
ni+1 = l(ni), p
ni+1 = pni , and R(ni+1) ∼= R(ni), i = 1, . . . , r − 1.
It is easy to see that a strategic buyer either accepts the price at the first node or rejects this price
in all of them, when the discount sequence γ is decreasing.
An optimal pricing was found in [22], where horizon-independent algorithms were studied and
the causes of a linear regret in different classes of consistent algorithms were analyzed step-by-step.
First, the algorithm FES [22] was proposed as a modification of the FS by injecting exploitation
rounds after each rejection to obtain a consistent horizon-independent algorithm against truthful
buyer with tight regret bound in Θ(log log T ). Second, this pricing was upgraded to the algorithm
PRRFES [22] to act against strategic buyers. Namely, it was shown that there is no no-regret pricing
5Note that the optimal strategy of a strategic buyer may not satisfy this property: it is easy to imagine an
algorithm that offers the price 1 at the first round and, if it is accepted, offers the price 0 all remaining rounds.
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in the class RWC, which comprises, in particular, all consistent horizon-independent algorithms
even being modified by penalization rounds. This led to a guess that possibly the left consistency
requirement should be relaxed. This guess succeeded in building of the optimal right-consistent
algorithm PRRFES with tight strategic regret bound in Θ(log log T ), while the research question
on the existence of a no-regret horizon-independent algorithm in the class WC remained open.
As stated at the beginning of this paper, our research goals comprise (a) closing of that open
research question; (b) improvement of the best known upper bounds on strategic regret by finding a
finer constant factor C of their principal term C log log T ; and (c) generalization of above mentioned
results to the cases of strategic buyers whose discounting is not only a geometric progression.
2.4 Related work
Most of studies on online advertising auctions lies in the field of game theory [33, 43]: a large part of
them focused on characterizing different aspects of equilibria, and recent ones was devoted (but not
limited) to: position auctions [51, 52, 53, 15], different generalizations of second-price auctions [3,
13], efficiency [2], mechanism expressiveness [23], competition across auction platforms [8], buyer
budget [1], experimental analysis [45, 50, 44], etc.
Studies on revenue maximization were devoted to both the seller revenue solely [56, 27] and
different sort of trade-offs either between several auction stakeholders [26, 25, 10] or between auction
characteristics (like revenue monotonicity [25], expressivity, and simplicity [41]). The optimization
problem was generally reduced to a selection of proper quality scores for advertisements (for auctions
with several advertisers [56, 27]) or reserve prices for buyers (e.g., in VCG [42], GSP [36], and
others [26, 46]). The reserve prices, in such setups, usually depend on distributions of buyer bids or
valuations and was in turn estimated by machine learning techniques [27, 49, 46], while alternative
approaches learned reserve prices directly [37, 38, 48]. In contrast to these works, we use an online
deterministic learning approach for repeated auctions.
Revenue optimization for repeated auctions was mainly concentrated on algorithmic reserve
prices, that are updated in online fashion over time, and was also known as dynamic pricing. An
extensive survey on this field is presented in [21]. Dynamic pricing was studied: under game-
theoretic view (MFE [30, 12], budget constraints [12, 11], strategic buyer behavior [18], dynamic
mechanisms [34, 7], etc.); as bandit problems [4, 57, 35] (e.g., UCB-like pricing [9], bandit feedback
models [54]); from the buyer side (valuation learning [30, 54], competition between buyers and
optimal bidding [29, 54], interaction with several sellers [28], etc.); from the seller side against several
buyers [14, 55, 31, 47, 24]; and a single buyer with stochastic valuation (myopic/truthful [32, 19, 16]
and strategic buyers [5, 6, 40, 40, 17, 22], feature-based pricing [6, 20], limited supply [9], etc.). The
most relevant part of these works to ours are [32, 5, 39, 22], where our scenario with a fixed private
valuation is considered and whose algorithms are discussed in more details in Sec. 2.3. First, in
contrast to [32], we study strategic buyer behavior, whose cumulative surplus may be discounted
non-geometrically (unlike in [32, 5, 39, 22]). Second, in contrast to [5, 39], we propose and analyze
algorithms that have tight strategic regret bound in Θ(log log T ), and, unlike in [22], one of these
algorithms is weakly consistent and never decreases offered prices. Finally, we reduce the factor of
the principal term in the strategic regret upper bound from [22] for the algorithm PRRFES.
3 Optimizing right-consistent optimal pricing
In this section, first, we show that the algorithm PRRFES [22] is able to retain its tight strategic
regret bound in Θ(log log T ) even against strategic buyers whose surplus is not necessarily dis-
counted geometrically. Second, we provide a finer upper bound for the PRRFES’s strategic regret,
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that allows to optimize the constant factor C of the principal term C log log T of this upper bound
by adjusting the number of penalization rounds used in the pricing algorithm. This result allows
to obtain a more favorable regret upper bound than in [22].
For the convenience of readers, we give a short description of the algorithm PRRFES in Ap-
pendix B and its pseudo-code in Alg. C.3. We begin our regret analysis for discount sequences of
general form by proving an analogue of [22, Prop.2], which was for a geometric discounting. Let
δln := p
n − infm∈L(n) pm be the left increment [39, 22], then the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. Let γ = {γt}∞t=1 be a decreasing discount sequence (whose sum converges), A be
a pricing algorithm, n ∈ T(A) be a starting node in a r-length penalization sequence (see Def. 5),
and r ∈ N s.t. γtn >
∑∞
t=tn+r γt. If the price p
n offered by the algorithm A at the node n is rejected
by the strategic buyer, then the following inequality on his valuation v holds:
v − pn < ζr,γ,tnδln, where ζr,γ,t :=
∑∞
s=t+r γs
γt −
∑∞
s=t+r γs
. (1)
The proof is presented in Appendix A.1.1 and is based on ideas similar to the ones in [22,
Prop.2]. Note that [22, Prop.2] is a particular case of Proposition 1, when γ = {γt−1}∞t=1 is a
geometric discounting for some γ ∈ (0, 1) (then ζr,γ,t becomes ζr,γ from [22, Prop.2]). For this case
of geometric discounting, the condition γtn >
∑∞
t=tn+r γt on r from Prop. 1 becomes r > logγ(1−γ).
The important property of the latter condition consists in its independence on the time (i.e., round,
depth) tn of the starting penalization node n. This independence property, namely, the property
∃r ∈ N s.t. ∀t ∈ N : γt >
∑∞
s=t+r γs, does not hold for an arbitrary discount sequence γ. But, in
the following lemma, we show that if a discount sequence is geometrically concave, then the above
mentioned independence property holds (see the proof in Appendix A.1.2).
Lemma 1. Let a decreasing sequence γ = {γt}∞t=1 be geometrically concave, i.e., γt+1/γt ≥
γt+2/γt+1 ∀t ∈ N, then (a) there exists r ∈ N s.t. ∀t ∈ N : γt >
∑∞
s=t+r γs; (b) moreover, for
any κ > 0, there exists rκ ∈ N s.t. ∀t ∈ N : ζrκ ,γ,t < κ.
For geometrically convex discount sequences, the properties in both claims of this lemma may
not hold. For instance, consider the telescoping discount γt = 1/t(t+ 1) (see Appendix A.1.3).
For a right-consistent algorithm A (and, thus, for the PRRFES as well [22]), the increment δln in
Prop. 1 is bounded by the difference between the current node’s price pn and the last accepted price
q before reaching this node. Hence, the inequality in Eq. (1) provides a guarantee on no-lies at a
particular round for certain valuations v: the closer an offered price is to the last accepted price the
smaller the interval of possible valuations v, holding which the strategic buyer may lie on this offer,
i.e, the buyer may lie at the tn-th round only if his valuation v is located in
[
q, pn + ζr,γ,tn(p
n− q)).
Using this insight, we can obtain the following theorem, whose proof is presented in Appendix A.1.4.
Theorem 1. Let γ = {γt}∞t=1 be a decreasing discount sequence (whose sum converges) for which
there exist κ > 0 and rκ ∈ N s.t. ∀t ∈ N : ζrκ ,γ,t < κ (the definition of ζ·,γ,t is from Eq. (1)). If
A is the pricing algorithm PRRFES with r ≥ rκ and the exploitation rate g(l) = 22l , l ∈ Z+, then,
for any valuation v ∈ [0, 1] and T ≥ 2, the strategic regret is upper bounded:
SReg(T,A, v,γ) ≤ Cr,κ(log2 log2 T + 2), where Cr,κ := rv +
(2 + κ)2 − 1
2
. (2)
First, combining Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, one concludes that the pricing PRRFES can be
effectively applied (with tight regret bound in Θ(log log T )), in particular, against strategic buyers
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with a geometrically concave discount sequence. Second, the result [22, Th.5] represents a corollary
of Th. 1, when we consider a geometric discounting γ = {γt−1}∞t=1, γ ∈ (0, 1), with parameters
κ = 1 and rκ = dlogγ((1 − γ)/2)e. But, more importantly, Th. 1 provides a novel regret upper
bound (even for a geometric discounting) that can be adjusted, e.g., to reduce the number of
penalization rounds or to optimize the constant factor Cr,κ. Let γ = {γt−1}∞t=1, γ ∈ (0, 1), then
one can easily derive the following dependence between κ and rκ in order to satisfy the conditions
of Th. 1: rκ ≥ dlogγ
( κ
1+κ (1− γ)
)e. Hence, Th. 1 allows us to retain the upper bound Eq. (2) valid
and reduce the number of penalization rounds r up to dlogγ(1 − γ)e. Note that this value is in
fact the lower bound for a number of penalization rounds r that satisfies Prop. 1 and [22, Prop.2].
Depending on γ, the number of penalization rounds r may be reduced by up to 100/(log1/2(1−γ)+1)
per cents; e.g., in integers, we can reduce r from 8 to 5 for γ = 0.75 and from 72 to 59 for γ = 0.95.
In order to analyze the capacity of possible improvement in optimal factor Cr,κ, let us bound
r by logγ
( κ
1+κ (1− γ)
)
+ 1 and v by 1, then this upper bound on Cr,κ has the following first-order
condition w.r.t. κ: κ(κ + 1)(κ + 2) = ln−1 1/γ, which has only one solution κ0 in (0,+∞). This
solution κ0 monotonically depends on the discount rate γ: the closer γ is to 0 the closer κ0 to 0,
and, vice-versa, κ0 → +∞ as γ → 1. For instance, let us consider the improvement of the bound
on the factor Cr,κ calculated for the optimal κ0 w.r.t. the one for κ = 1: the factor is reduced by
33.2% for γ = 0.05 with κ0 ≈ 0.137; by 22.9% for γ = 0.25 with κ0 ≈ 0.255; by 1.5% for γ = 0.75
with κ0 ≈ 0.734; by 2.8% for γ = 0.95 with κ0 ≈ 1.815; and by 6.3% for γ = 0.99 with κ0 ≈ 3.706.
Thus, we conclude that Theorem 1 outperforms the strategic regret upper bound of [22, Th.5].
4 Weakly consistent pricing
In this section, we, first, generalize the result [22, Th.4] on the absence of no-regret algorithm in
the class RWC to any discount sequence of the buyer surplus and, moreover, show that any weakly
consistent algorithm with double decrease of offered prices has a linear regret. This motivates us to
hypothesize that there exists a no-regret pricing in WC which only increases offered prices. Second,
we propose a novel transformation of pricing algorithms and apply it to the algorithm PRRFES
obtaining a weakly consistent pricing. Finally, we argue that this algorithm is a no-regret one and,
moreover, has tight strategic regret bound in Θ(log log T ).
4.1 Weakly consistent algorithms with linear regret
First of all, we isolate the main cause of a linear regret of a wide range of weakly consistent
algorithms and formalize it in the following lemma, whose proof is deferred to Appendix A.2.1.
Lemma 2. Let γ = {γt}∞t=1 be a discount sequence and A ∈WC be a horizon-independent weakly
consistent pricing algorithm s.t. the first offered price pe(T(A)) ∈ (0, 1). If there exists a path a˜ in
the tree T(A) with the corresponding price sequence {p˜t}∞t=1 s.t.
∃t˜0, t˜1 ∈ N : t˜0 ≤ t˜1 and p˜t˜1+1 < p˜t˜0 < pe(T(A)), (3)
then there exists a valuation v ∈ [0, 1] s.t. SReg(T,A, v,γ) = Ω(T ).
Note that this lemma holds for any discount sequence and has the following corollary, which is
the generalization of [22, Th.4] to any discounting and whose proof is presented in Appendix A.2.2.
Corollary 1. For any horizon-independent regular weakly consistent pricing algorithm A and any
discount sequence γ = {γt}∞t=1, there exists a valuation v ∈ [0, 1] s.t. SReg(T,A, v,γ) = Ω(T ).
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The key intuition behind Lemma 2 consists in the following: the strategic buyer can lie few
times to decrease offered prices and, due to (even weak) consistency, receive prices at least on ε > 0
lower than his valuation v all the remaining rounds. Note that the buyer is able to mislead a wide
range of weakly consistent algorithms: this set of algorithms (that satisfy conditions of Lemma 2)
is significantly larger than the set RWC of regular weakly consistent ones. But, what if the buyer
cannot apply this intuition? After all, there are weakly consistent algorithms that never decrease
offered prices. We hypothesize thus that there may exist such an algorithm with a sublinear regret.
In Sec. 4.3, this hypothesis is confirmed.
4.2 Transformation pre
Let us consider a special transformation referred to as pre and which transforms any pricing
algorithm to another one. First, we define this transformation for labeled binary trees.
Definition 6. Given a non-negative real number q ∈ R+ and a labeled binary tree T1, the transfor-
mation pre : (q,T1) 7→ T2 is such that the labels (i.e., prices) of the tree T2 are defined recursively
in the following way starting from the root node e(T2) of the tree T2:
pe(T2) := q, L
(
e(T2)
) ∼= pre(q,L(e(T1))) and R(e(T2)) ∼= pre(pe(T1),R(e(T1))). (4)
Second, since each pricing algorithm is associated with a complete binary tree T(A), the trans-
formation pre is thus correctly defined for pricing algorithms: namely, pre : R+ × A → A and
pre(q,A1) is the pricing algorithm associated with the tree pre(q,T(A1)). In Algorithm C.2, for
better understanding, we provide a reader with a pseudo-code that applies the pricing pre(q,A)
with given q ∈ R and a source pricing A ∈ A6. Informally speaking, this transformation tracks
over the nodes in the source algorithm’s tree T(A), but, being in a current node n ∈ T(A), it offers
the price from one of preceding nodes, where the buyer purchased a good last time (or q if never
purchased), instead of offering the price pn from the current node n. From the buyer’s point of
view, the choice between the pricing of the subtrees L(n) and R(n) of a node n ∈ T(A) should be
made at the round previous to the one where the price pn will be offered. Overall, these intuitions
could be used to obtain the following lemma (see the proof in Appendix A.3.1).
Lemma 3. Let A ∈ CR be a right-consistent pricing algorithm and q = inf ℘(A) be the infimum of
the algorithm prices, then the transformed pricing algorithm pre(q,A) is both right-consistent and
weakly consistent, i.e., pre(q,A) ∈WC ∩CR.
Note that the transformed algorithm pre(q,A) for A ∈ CR is only able to increase prices
starting from q and it never decreases them regardless of any buyer strategy (see Appendix A.3.1).
4.3 Weakly consistent optimal pricing
Let us apply the transformation pre to the pricing algorithm PRRFES and refer to the transformed
one as prePRRFES. Formally, the algorithm prePRRFES works in phases initialized by the phase
index l := 0, the first offered price at the current phase q0 := 0, and the iteration parameter
0 := 1/2; at each phase l ∈ Z+, it sequentially offers prices pl,k := ql + kl, k ∈ Z+ (exploration, in
contrast to PRRFES, it starts from k = 0), where
l := 
2
l−1 = 2
−2l , Nl := l−1/l = −1l−1 = 2
2l−1 , l ∈ N; (5)
6We put side-by-side Alg. C.2 with Alg. C.1 in order to show the difference between the work flow of the transformed
pricing pre(q,A) and the one of the source pricing A.
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if a price pl,k with k = Kl ≥ 0 is rejected, (1) it offers this price pl,Kl for r−1 penalization rounds (if
one of them is accepted, prePRRFES continues offering pl,k, k = Kl+1, .. following the Definition 5),
(2) it offers the price pl,Kl for g(l) exploitation rounds (buyer decisions made at them do not affect
further pricing), and (3) prePRRFES goes to the next phase by setting ql+1 := pl,Kl and l := l+ 1.
The pseudo-code of prePRRFES is presented in Alg. C.4, where the lines that differ from the ones
of PRRFES (see Alg. C.3) are highlighted in blue. Since PRRFES is a right-consistent algorithm,
Lemma 3 implies that prePRRFES is both right-consistent and weakly consistent one.
In this subsection, we will show that prePRRFES being properly configured is, in fact, a no-
regret pricing and, moreover, is optimal with tight strategic regret bound in Θ(log log T ). To show
this, we follow the methodology of establishing the optimality of the algorithm PRRFES; however,
this is not straightforward and requires additional statements (see Prop. 3) not needed for PRRFES.
In order to simplify further analysis, we assume that the discounting is geometric γ = {γt−1}∞t=1
from here on in this subsection7. First, let us consider an analogue of Proposition 1 that will be
useful to upper bound the strategic regret of the algorithm prePRRFES.
Proposition 2. Let γ = {γt−1}∞t=1 be a discount sequence with γ ∈ (0, 1), A be a pricing algorithm,
n ∈ T(A) be a starting node in a r-length penalization sequence (see Def. 5), all prices after r
rejections are no lower than pn (i.e., pn ≤ pm ∀m ∈ L(lr−1(n))), and r > logγ(1− γ2). If the price
pn offered by the algorithm A at the node n is rejected by the strategic buyer, then the following
inequality on his valuation v holds:
v − pr(n) < ηr,γ(pr(n) − pn), where ηr,γ := γ
r + γ − 1
1− γ2 − γr . (6)
The proof is given in Appendix A.4.1. Note that, similarly to Eq. (1), the inequality in Eq. (6)
bounds the deviation of the buyer’s valuation v from the price at some node r(n) by some increment
pr(n) − pn. But, in contrast to Eq. (1), this bounding occurs when the buyer rejects the price pn
offered previously to the one pr(n) which is used as the reference price of the valuation’s deviation.
As we show in the proof of Theorem 2, Prop. 2 allows us to obtain an upper bound for the
number of exploring steps at each phase of the algorithm prePRRFES (like Prop. 1 is used for
the algorithm PRRFES). However, this is not enough to directly apply the methodology of the
proofs of [22, Th.3, Th.5] and Theorem 1 to bound the strategic regret, because, in contrast to
the PRRFES, during exploitation rounds, the algorithm prePRRFES offers the price pl,Kl that
has not been earlier accepted by the strategic buyer (hence, there is no evidence to guarantee his
acceptance during the exploitation). Namely, since the buyer’s decision at made at an exploitation
round t does not affect the algorithm’s pricing in the subsequent rounds t′ > t, the strategic buyer
acts truthfully at this round t, i.e., at = I{pt≤v}. For the PRRFES, we knew that the price pt was
accepted in a previous round t′ < t (or pt = 0), but, for the prePRRFES, one has to specially
guarantee the acceptance of the price pt at the exploitation round t in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let γ = {γt−1}∞t=1 be a discount sequence with γ ∈ (0, 1), A be a pricing algorithm,
and n ∈ T(A) be a starting node in a r-length penalization sequence (see Def. 5), which is followed
by G exploitation rounds offering the price pn starting from the node lr(n). If r < logγ(1 − γ),
G > logγ
(
1 − (1 − γ)γ−r), T ≥ tn + r + G − 1, and the buyer valuation v is higher than pn and
lower than any price in the right subtree R(n) of the node n, i.e., v < p ∀p ∈ ℘(R(n)), then the
strategic buyer rejects the price pn at the round tn.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.4.2. Additionally to the claim of Proposition 3, note that,
from the definitions of penalization and exploitation rounds, it follows that, if the strategic buyer
7An analysis for non-geometric discount sequences could be done in a similar way as for Theorem 1.
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rejects the price pn at the round tn, he rejects this price pn at the rounds tn + 1, . . . , tn + r − 1 as
well and accepts it at the rounds tn + r, . . . , tn + r+G− 1. Note that, since r ≥ 1 (otherwise, there
is no node n and the right subtree R(n)), the condition r < logγ(1− γ) makes Prop. 3 meaningful
only in the case of γ > 1/2. This is consistent with a clear intuition that, having γ ≤ 1/2, the
discount γt−1 at a round t is no lower than the sum of all discounts in all possible subsequent
rounds γt/(1− γ), and the strategic buyer prefers thus to purchase a good for a price pt at the t-th
round, rather than many goods for a no lower price in all subsequent rounds.
In order to use both Prop. 2 and Prop. 3, the number of penalization rounds r is required to
be in
(
logγ(1− γ2), logγ(1− γ)
)
. We restrict γ by the condition (1 + γ)γ > 1 in order to have the
length of this interval larger than 1 and guarantee thus existence of a natural number in it (since
r ∈ N). This restriction implies that γ should be larger than (√5− 1)/2. For such discount rates,
the following lemma (with the proof in Appendix A.4.3) provides values for r and G s.t. Prop. 2
and Prop. 3 hold and ηr,γ (from Eq. (6)) is bounded by some positive number κ > 0.
Lemma 4. Let the discount rate γ ∈ ((√5 − 1)/2, 1), a constant κ > (1 − γ)/(γ2 + γ − 1), the
number of penalization rounds r = drγ,κe, and the number of exploitation rounds G ≥ Gγ,κ, where
rγ,κ := logγ
(
(1− γ)
(
1 +
κ
1 + κ
γ
))
and Gγ,κ := logγ
(
1−
(
1 +
κ
1 + κ
γ
)−1
γ−1
)
. (7)
Then the conditions of Prop. 2 and Prop. 3 hold, and ηr,γ ≤ κ.
Now we ready to obtain an upper bound for the prePRRFES by proving the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let γ = {γt−1}∞t=1 be a discount sequence with γ ∈
(
(
√
5 − 1)/2, 1), a constant
κ > (1 − γ)/(γ2 + γ − 1), while the constants rγ,κ and Gγ,κ be from Eq. (7). If A is the pricing
algorithm prePRRFES with r = drγ,κe and the exploitation rate g(l) = max{22l , dGγ,κe}, l ∈ Z+,
then, for any valuation v ∈ [0, 1] and T ≥ 2, the strategic regret is upper bounded:
SReg(T,A, v,γ) ≤
(
rv +
(1 + κ)
2
(2 + max{2, dGγ,κe}+ κ)
)
(log2 log2 T + 2) +
dGγ,κe
2
− 1. (8)
The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix A.4.4 and is based on the methodology of
the proof of Th. 1, but requires special modifications as discussed above. Theorem 2 confirms our
hypothesis on the existence of a no-regret algorithm in the class WC and closes thus the corre-
sponding open research question [22]. An attentive reader may note that the pricing prePRRFES
has the following drawback: this algorithm being applied against a myopic (truthful) buyer will
incur a linear regret (in contrast to the source PRRFES). But we feel that this is the price we
have to pay in order to construct a horizon-independent optimal algorithm that offers prices in a
consistent manner (i.e., never revise prices that was previously reduced as it did by the PRRFES).
5 Conclusions
We studied horizon-independent online learning (discrete) algorithms in the scenario of repeated
posted-price auctions with a strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation. First, we closed
the open research question on the existence of a no-regret horizon-independent weakly consistent
algorithm by proposing a novel algorithm that never decreases offered prices and can be applied
against strategic buyers with a tight regret bound in Θ(log log T ). Second, we provided an upper
bound on strategic regret of the algorithm PRRFES, that allows to optimize the constant factor
C of its principal term C log log T , outperforming thus the previously best known upper bounds.
Finally, we generalized the previously known lower and upper bounds on strategic regret to classes
of discount sequences that are wider than geometric progressions.
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A Missed proofs
A.1 Missed proofs from Section 3
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For each node m ∈ T(A), let S(m) be the surplus obtained by the buyer when playing an
optimal strategy against A after reaching the node m. Since the price pn is rejected at the node n
by the strategic buyer, there following inequality on surpluses holds:
γtn(v − pn) + S(r(n)) < S(l(n)). (A.1)
First, for the case r > 1, we show that rejection of the price pn at the node n implies rejection of
this price at the subsequent penalization nodes ls(n), s = 1, . . . , r−1, as well. Indeed, let us assume
the contrary: the strategic buyer accepts the price at the node ls(n) for some s = 1, . . . , r − 1
(let s be the smallest one). Hence, the optimal strategy passes through the right subtree R(ls(n)),
which is price equivalent to the tree R(n), i.e., R(ls(n)) ∼= R(n) (by Def. 5 of a penalization
sequence). Let {a˜t}∞t=tn+s+1 be the part of this optimal strategy within the subtree R(ls(n)) (with
the corresponding sequence of prices {p˜t}∞t=tn+s+1), then we consider the strategy {aˆt}∞t=tn+1 with
the same sequence of decisions, but made after acceptance of the price pn at the node n: aˆt := a˜t+s.
Since R(ls(n)) ∼= R(n), the corresponding prices will be the same: pˆt = p˜t+s. Hence, we have
S(l(n)) = S(ls(n)) = γtn+s
(
v − pls(n)
)
+ S(r(ls(n))) = γtn+s
(
v − pls(n)
)
+
∞∑
t=tn+s+1
γta˜t(v − p˜t) =
γtn+s(v − pn) +
∞∑
t=tn+1
γt+saˆt(v − pˆt) < γtn(v − pn) +
∞∑
t=tn+1
γtaˆt(v − pˆt) ≤ γtn(v − pn) + S(r(n)),
(A.2)
where we used, in the first inequality, the fact that the discount sequence γ is decreasing and, in
the second one, that {aˆt}∞t=tn+1 generates surplus in R(n) at most S(r(n)). In Eq. (A.2), we obtain
a contradiction to Eq. (A.1). Therefore, the following inequality holds:
γtn(v − pn) + S(r(n)) < S(l(n)) = S(lr(n)). (A.3)
The surplus S(r(n)) is lower bounded by 0, while the left subtree’s surplus S(lr(n)) can be upper
bounded as follows (using pn − pm ≤ δln ∀m ∈ L(n)):
S(lr(n)) ≤
T∑
t=tn+r
γt(v − pn + δln) <
∞∑
t=tn+r
γt(v − pn + δln),
We plug these bounds in Eq. (A.3) and obtain
(v − pn)
(
γtn −
∞∑
t=tn+r
γt
)
<
∞∑
t=tn+r
γtδ
l
n,
that implies Eq. (1), since r s.t. γtn >
∑∞
t=tn+r γt.
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A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let αt+1 := γt+1/γt, t ∈ N, then, from the non-convexity, we have αt+1 ≥ αt+2 ∀t ∈ N. In
particular, αt+1 ≤ α2 < 1, t ∈ N, since γ is decreasing. So, for any t, t′ ∈ N,
γt+t′ = αt+t′αt+t′−1 . . . αt+1γt ≤ αt′t γt ≤ αt
′
2 γt.
Hence,
∞∑
s=t+r
γs ≤
∞∑
s=t+r
αs−t2 γt =
αr2
1− α2γt.
Taking r > logα2(1 − α2) and rκ > logα2
(
κ(1 − α2)/(1 + κ)
)
, we obtain both claims of the
lemma.
A.1.3 Telescoping discount sequence γt = 1/t(t+ 1) does not satisfy Prop. 1
Note that this discount sequence is geometrically convex, i.e., γt+1/γt ≤ γt+2/γt+1 ∀t ∈ N.
Let us show that for γt =
1
t(t+1) the property ∃r ∈ N s.t. ∀t ∈ N : γt >
∑∞
s=t+r γs does not
hold. Indeed, assume the contrary: let r be s.t. ∀t ∈ N : γt >
∑∞
s=t+r γs. We have
∑∞
s=t+r γs =
1/(t+r−1), which implies ∀t ∈ N : 1t(t+1) > 1t+r−1 or, equivalently, t+r−1 > t2+ t, i.e., r > t2+1.
Take t = r and get a contradiction in r > r2 + 1.
A.1.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The proof is fairly similar to the one of [22, Th.5]. So, let L be the number of phases
conducted by the algorithm during T rounds, then we decompose the total regret over T rounds
into the sum of the phases’ regrets: SReg(T,A, v,γ) = ∑Ll=0Rl. For the regret Rl at each phase
except the last one, the following identity holds:
Rl =
Kl∑
k=1
(v − pl,k) + rv + g(l)(v − pl,Kl), l = 0, . . . , L− 1, (A.4)
where the first, second, and third terms correspond to the exploration rounds with acceptance, the
reject-penalization rounds, and the exploitation rounds8, respectively. First, note that the optimal
strategy is locally non-losing one for A ∈ CR (see the discussion after [22, Lemma 1]). Hence,
since the price pl,Kl is 0 or has been accepted, we have pl,Kl ≤ v. Second, since the price pl,Kl+1
is rejected, we have v − pl,Kl+1 < κ(pl,Kl+1 − pl,Kl) = κl (by Proposition 1 since ζr,γ,t < κ for
r ≥ rκ and any t ∈ N). Hence, the valuation v ∈
[
pl,Kl , pl,Kl + (1 + κ)l
)
and all accepted prices
pl+1,k, ∀k ≤ Kl+1, from the next phase l + 1 satisfy:
pl+1,k ∈ [ql+1, v) ⊆
[
pl,Kl , pl,Kl + (1 + κ)l
) ∀k ≤ Kl+1,
because any accepted price has to be lower than the valuation v for the strategic buyer (whose
optimal strategy is locally non-losing one, as we stated above). This infers Kl+1 < (1 + κ)Nl+1 ≤⌈
(1 + κ)Nl+1
⌉
=: Nl+1,κ. Therefore, for the phases l = 1, . . . , L, we have:
v − pl,Kl < (1 + κ)l; v − pl,k < l
(
(1 + κ)Nl − k
) ∀k ∈ ZNl,κ ;
8Note that the prices at the exploitation rounds pl,Kl are equal to either 0 or an earlier accepted price, and are
thus accepted by the strategic buyers (since the buyer’s decisions at these rounds do not affect further pricing of the
algorithm PRRFES).
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and
Kl∑
k=1
(v − pl,k) < l
Nl,κ−1∑
k=1
(
(1 + κ)Nl − k
)
= l
Nl,κ − 1
2
(
2(1 + κ)Nl −Nl,κ
) ≤
≤ l (1 + κ)Nl
2
(1 + κ)Nl =
(1 + κ)2
2
Nl ·Nll = (1 + κ)
2
2
Nl · l−1 = (1 + κ)
2
2
,
where we used the definitions of Nl and l (i.e., Nll = l−1 and Nl = −1l ). For the zeroth phase
l = 0, one has trivial bound
∑K0
k=1(v − p0,k) ≤ 1/2. Hence, by definition of the exploitation rate
g(l), we have g(l) = −1l and, thus,
Rl ≤ (1 + κ)
2
2
+ rv + g(l) · (1 + κ)l ≤ rv + (2 + κ)
2 − 1
2
, l = 0, . . . , L− 1. (A.5)
Moreover, this inequality holds for the L-th phase, since it differs from the other ones only in
possible absence of some rounds (reject-penalization or exploitation ones). Namely, for the L-th
phase, we have:
RL =
KL∑
k=1
(v − pL,k) + rLv + gL(L)(v − pL,KL), (A.6)
where rL is the actual number of reject-penalization rounds and gL(L) is the actual number of
exploitation ones in the last phase. Since rL ≤ r and gL(L) ≤ g(L), the right-hand side of Eq. (A.6)
is upper-bounded by the right-hand side of Eq. (A.4) with l = L, which is in turn upper-bounded
by the right-hand side of Eq. (A.5). Finally, one has
SReg(T,A, v,γ) =
L∑
l=0
Rl ≤
(
rv +
(2 + κ)2 − 1
2
)
(L+ 1).
Thus, one needs only to estimate the number of phases L by the number of rounds T . So, for
2 ≤ T ≤ 2+r+g(0), we have L = 0 or 1 and thus L+1 ≤ 2 ≤ log2 log2 T+2. For T ≥ 2+r+g(0), we
have T =
∑L−1
l=0 (Kl+r+g(l))+KL+rL+gL(L) ≥ g(L−1) with L > 0. Hence, g(L−1) = 22
L−1 ≤ T ,
which is equivalent to L ≤ log2 log2 T + 1. Summarizing, we get Eq. (2).
A.2 Missed proofs from Section 4.1
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let us denote the first offered price as p1 := p
e(T(A))9 and decompose the set of all buyer
strategies (i.e., paths in the tree T(A)) into three sets B0 unionsqB− unionsqB+:
• B0 contains strategies whose price sequences {pt}∞t=1 are constant: pt = p1 ∀t ∈ N;
• for a strategy from B−, the price sequence {pt}∞t=1 has the form: ∃t0 ∈ N s.t. pt0+1 < pt0 and
pt = p1, t = 1, . . . , t0;
• for a strategy from B+, its price sequence {pt}∞t=1 has the form: ∃t0 ∈ N s.t. pt0+1 > pt0 and
pt = p1, t = 1, . . . , t0.
9Note that p1 is the first element in a price sequence of any buyer strategy for a given A.
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Note that B− 6= ∅ since it contains the strategy a˜ whose price sequence is defined in Eq. (3). Based
on this strategy a˜, let us consider the strategy aˆ s.t. it coincides with a˜ at up to the t˜1-th round,
i.e., aˆt := a˜t ∀t ≤ t˜1, and aˆt := 1 ∀t > t˜1. It easy to see that aˆ ∈ B−. We denote the corresponding
price sequence by {pˆt}∞t=1.
Let us denote ∆ = p1 − pˆt˜0 > 0, then, ∀t ≥ t˜1, pˆt ≤ pˆt˜0 = p1 −∆ (due to the weak consistency
of the algorithm A10). Hence, on the one hand, the surplus of the strategy aˆ followed by a buyer
with the valuation vε := p1 + ε can be lower bounded in the following way:
Surγ(T,A, vε, aˆ) ≥
T∑
t=t˜1+1
γt(∆ + ε) ∀T > t˜1. (A.7)
On the other hand, one can upper bound the surplus of a strategy a ∈ B+ followed by a buyer
with the valuation vε since the price sequence corresponding to a satisfies pt ≥ p1 ∀t ∈ N:
Surγ(T,A, vε,a) ≤
T∑
t=1
γtε ∀a ∈ B+ ∀T > 0. (A.8)
Let
ε0 := min
{
∆
γt˜1+1∑t˜1
t=1 γt
, 1− p1
}
,
then, ∀ε ∈ (0, ε0), first, vε ∈ (0, 1) and, second,
ε < ∆
∑T
t=t˜1+1
γt∑t˜1
t=1 γt
∀T > t˜1.
Therefore, the right-hand side of Eq. (A.7) is larger than the one of Eq. (A.8), which implies that
Surγ(T,A, vε,a) < Surγ(T,A, vε, aˆ) ∀a ∈ B+.
Thus, we showed that, for T > t˜1, there exists a strategy in B− (namely, aˆ) that is better
(in terms of discounted surplus) than any strategy in B+ for the buyer with the valuation vε =
p1 + ε, ε ∈ (0, ε0). Therefore, the optimal strategy aOpt must belong to either B0 or B− for T > t˜1.
But, for any strategy a from B0 ∪B−, one can lower bound the regret by
Reg(T,A, vε,a) ≥
∑
t:at=0
vε +
∑
t:at=1
(vε − p1) ≥ Tε,
and, hence, the strategic regret: SReg(T,A, vε,γ) ≥ Tε for T > t˜1. This lower bound is Ω(T ) since
ε and t˜1 are independent of T .
A.2.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. If the algorithm A is not dense, then the theorem holds since any non-dense horizon-
independent regular weakly consistent algorithm has linear strategic regret (see [22, Cor.1]). First,
let us consider the case when the first offered price p1 := p
e(T(A)) ∈ (0, 1) and show existence of a
path a˜ in the tree T(A) that satisfies Eq. (3) from Lemma 2.
Indeed, since A is dense there exists a node n ∈ T(A) s.t. pn ∈ (0, p1); let us take the one with
the smallest depth tn, denote p′ := pn; t′ := tn, and consider the path aˆ1:t′−1 from the root to this
node n. For the corresponding price sequence {pˆt}t′t=1, the following holds:
10In fact, it easy to derive (using the weak consistency) that pˆt ≤ pˆt˜0 ∀t ≥ t˜0. Because, otherwise, if ∃t′ : t˜0 < t′ < t˜1
s.t. pˆt′ > pˆt˜0 , which implies pˆt ≥ pˆt˜0 ∀t > t′ and contradicts to pˆt˜1 < pˆt˜0 .
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• pˆt ≤ p1 ∀t ≤ t′ due to the weak consistency of the algorithm A;
• pˆt ∈ {0, p1} ∀t < t′ due to the choice of the node n with minimal tn.
Since the algorithm A is regular weakly consistent, for any path a from the root s.t. its price
sequence {pt}∞t=1 contains a price lower than p1, the price sequence {pt}∞t=1 must be similar to
{pˆt}t′t=1 at the beginning. Namely, there exists a node m ∈ T(A) s.t. the path a passes through this
node m, pm = ptm = p
′, and pt ∈ {0, p1} ∀t < tm. Moreover, T(m) ∼= T(n) since A ∈ RWC as well.
Hence, if ℘(T(n)) ∩ (0, p′) = ∅, then ℘(T(A)) ∩ (0, p′) = ∅, that contradicts to the density of the
algorithm A. Therefore, there exists a node nˆ ∈ T(n) s.t. pnˆ ∈ (0, p′). Continuing the path aˆ1:t′−1
to this node nˆ, one gets the desired path a˜ in the tree T(A) that satisfies Eq. (3) from Lemma 2,
which implies linear strategic regret for the algorithm A in the case p1 ∈ (0, 1).
Let us consider the case of p1 = 0 or 1. Since A is dense, then, there exists a node n ∈ T(A)
such that pn ∈ (0, 1); we denote by n˜ the one among them with the smallest depth tn. So, the
problem of strategic regret estimation reduces to the previously considered case of 0 < p1 < 1 and
resolves by replacing p1 with p
n˜ in our reasoning. The only one thing left to be proven is that the
optimal buyer strategy will either pass trough the pricing of T(n˜), or will have a linear regret.
Let n1 → . . . → nt˜ be the path from the root n1 = e(T(A)) to the node nt˜ = n˜. If, for some
t = 1, . . . , t˜ − 1, we have pnt = pnt+1 , then pr(nt) = pl(nt), since, otherwise, by the regularity of A
(see Definition 3), we would have:
• either R(nt) = R(nt+1) for pnt = 0 (L(nt) = L(nt+1) for pnt = 1), that contradicts to the
definition of n˜ with the smallest depth;
• or pm = pnt ∀m ∈ T(nt+1), that contradicts to the existence of n˜ with pn˜ ∈ (0, 1).
Hence, in this case of pnt = pnt+1 , by regularity of A, we have that:
• either the buyer decision at the node nt does not affect the further pricing: R(nt) = L(nt),
i.e., the optimal buyer strategy may not pass exactly through the edge nt → nt+1, but, if the
buyer select the other edge from the node nt, he will face the subtree which is price equivalent
to the subtree T(nt+1);
• or nt+1 = r(nt) for pnt = 0 (nt+1 = l(nt) for pnt = 1) and pm = pnt ∀m ∈ L(nt) ( ∀m ∈ R(nt),
resp.); thus, if the optimal strategy passes through the alternative node l(nt) (r(nt), resp.),
then the seller will get a linear regret.
If pnt+1 6= pnt = 0, t = 1, .., t˜− 1, then, again by the regularity of A, any sub-strategy in the left
subtree L(nt) (a path starting from l(nt), i.e., from the alternative to the choice of the right child
nt+1 decision) has one of the following forms:
• (a) there is no any acceptance;
• there is an acceptance and after the first acceptance the buyer either
– (b) will receive pricing of the tree R(nt); or
– (c) will always receive the price 0.
If the buyer uses a strategy from the cases (a) and (c), then the seller will get a linear regret. The
case (b) means that the algorithm A will behave similarly whenever the buyer accepts the price 0: at
the round tnt or after several rejections. Hence, the strategic buyer will accept 0 at the round tnt (i.e.,
the buyer follows the edge nt → nt+1). The examination of the case pnt+1 6= pnt = 1, t = 1, .., t˜− 1
is similar.
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A.3 Missed proofs from Section 4.2
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First, for each node n ∈ T(pre(q,A)), the recursion in Eq. (4) implies that there exists a
node m ∈ T(A) s.t. L(n) ∼= pre(pn,L(m)) and R(n) ∼= pre(pm,R(m)). In particular, pr(n) = pm,
pl(n) = pn, ℘(L(n)) = ℘(L(m)) ∪ {pn}, and ℘(R(n)) = ℘(R(m)) ∪ {pm}. Let us prove by induction
that pn ≤ p ∀p ∈ ℘(T(n)): (a) this condition (the basis of the induction) is satisfied by the root
node e(T(pre(q,A))) due to the choice of q; and (b) the inductive step holds due to pl(n) = pn ≤
p ∀p ∈ ℘(L(n)) ⊆ ℘(T(n)) and pr(n) = pm ≤ p ∀p ∈ ℘(R(n)) = ℘(R(m)) ∪ {pm}, where we used
pm ≤ p ∀p ∈ ℘(R(m)) since the algorithm A is right-consistent.
Second, note that pn ≤ p ∀p ∈ ℘(T(n)) ⊇ ℘(R(n)), i.e., the definition of a right-consistent
algorithm holds. Therefore, pre(q,A) ∈ CR and the right-side part of weak consistency holds as
well. Third, pl(n) = pn ∀n ∈ T(pre(q,A)) as we noted above, and, hence, the left-side part of weak
consistency is satisfied (the case of pl(n) 6= pn in Definition 2 of WC is never realized).
A.4 Missed proofs from Section 4.3
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Prop. 1, let S(m) be the surplus obtained by the buyer when playing
an optimal strategy against A after reaching the node m, for each node m ∈ T(A). Since the price
pn is rejected then the following inequality holds (see [39, Lemma 1] or the proof of Prop. 1)
γt
n−1(v − pn) + S(r(n)) < S(lr(n)). (A.9)
The left subtree’s surplus S(lr(n)) can be upper bounded as follows (using pn ≤ pm∀m ∈ L(lr−1(n))):
S(lr(n)) ≤
T∑
t=tn+r
γt−1(v − pn) < γ
tn+r−1
1− γ (v − p
n);
while, in contrast to the proof of Prop. 1, we lower bound the right subtree’s surplus S(r(n)) by
γt
n
(v − pr(n))11, because, after accepting pn at the round tn, the buyer is able to earn at least this
amount at the round tn + 1. We plug these bounds in Eq. (A.9), divide by γt
n−1, and obtain
(v − pr(n) + pr(n) − pn) + γ(v − pr(n)) < γ
r
1− γ (v − p
r(n) + pr(n) − pn)⇔
⇔ (v − pr(n))
(
1 + γ − γ
r
1− γ
)
<
(
γr
1− γ − 1
)
(pr(n) − pn),
that implies Eq. (6), since r > logγ(1− γ2) implies 1− γ2 − γr > 0.
A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. As in the proofs of Prop. 1 and Prop. 2, let S(m) be the surplus obtained by the buyer
when playing an optimal strategy against A after reaching the node m, for each node m ∈ T(A).
The condition v < p ∀p ∈ ℘(R(n)) implies that S(r(n)) = 0 and the strategic buyer will thus gain
exactly γt
n−1(v − pn) if he accepts the price pn at the round tn. Let us show that there exists a
11This term may be negative (when v < pr(n)), but the lower bound on optimal surplus S(r(n)) holds a fortiori in
this case.
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strategy in L(n) with a larger surplus. Indeed, if the buyer rejects r times the price pn and accepts
this price G times after that, then he gets the following surplus:
tn+r+G−1∑
s=tn+r
γs−1(v − pn) = γ
tn+r−1 − γtn+r−1+G
1− γ (v − p
n) = γt
n−1γr
1− γG
1− γ (v − p
n) > γt
n−1(v − pn),
where the last inequality holds due to the condition on G and
γr(1− γG)/(1− γ) > 1⇔ (1− γG) > (1− γ)γ−r ⇔ γG < 1− (1− γ)γ−r.
A.4.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. In order to get the claims of this lemma, one just needs to straightforwardly verify few
inequalities. Namely, for Prop. 2, we have:
r = drγ,κe ≥ rγ,κ = logγ
(
(1− γ)
(
1 +
κ
1 + κ
γ
))
> logγ ((1− γ)(1 + γ)) = logγ(1− γ2)
since κ/(1 + κ) < 1 ∀κ > 0; and
ηr,γ =
γr + γ − 1
1− γ2 − γr ≤
(1− γ)
(
1 + κ1+κγ
)
+ γ − 1
1− γ2 − (1− γ)
(
1 + κ1+κγ
) = 1 + κ1+κγ − 1
1 + γ − 1− κ1+κγ
= κ.
For Prop. 3, we have:
r = drγ,κe < rγ,κ + 1 = logγ(1− γ) + logγ
((
1 +
κ
1 + κ
γ
)
γ
)
< logγ(1− γ)
since
(
1 + κ1+κγ
)
γ > 1 due to κ > (1− γ)/(γ2 + γ − 1); and, finally,
G ≥ Gγ,κ = logγ
(
1−
(
1 +
κ
1 + κ
γ
)−1
γ−1
)
> logγ
(
1− (1− γ)γ−r) ,
where we used
(
1 + κ1+κγ
)
γ < γr/(1− γ) since r < rγ,κ + 1.
A.4.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Note that the conditions of this theorem allow us to apply Lemma 4, Prop. 2, and Prop. 3,
that make the other technique of the proof similar to the one of Theorem 1. So, let L be the number
of phases conducted by the algorithm during T rounds, then we decompose the total regret over T
rounds into the sum of the phases’ regrets: SReg(T,A, v,γ) = ∑Ll=0Rl. For the regret Rl at each
phase except the last one, the following identity holds:
Rl =
Kl−1∑
k=0
(v − pl,k) + rv + g(l)(v − pl,Kl), l = 0, . . . , L− 1, (A.10)
where the first, second, and third terms correspond to the exploration rounds with acceptance, the
reject-penalization rounds, and the exploitation rounds, respectively. First, note that here, in the
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exploitation rounds, we directly use Proposition 3 (via Lemma 4 since g(l) ≥ Gγ,κ) to conclude that
pl,Kl < v and the price pl,Kl is thus accepted by the strategic buyer at the exploitation rounds (since
the buyer’s decisions at these rounds do not affect further pricing of the algorithm prePRRFES
and pl,Kl < v).
Second, since the price pl,Kl is rejected, we have v − pl,Kl+1 < κ(pl,Kl+1 − pl,Kl) = κl (by
Proposition 2 via Lemma 4 since ηr,γ ≤ κ for r ≥ drγ,κe and any t ∈ N). Hence, the valuation
v ∈ (pl,Kl , pl,Kl + (1 + κ)l) and all accepted prices pl+1,k, ∀k ≤ Kl+1, from the next phase l + 1
satisfy:
pl+1,k ∈ (ql+1, v) ⊆
(
pl,Kl , pl,Kl + (1 + κ)l
) ∀k ≤ Kl+1,
because any accepted price has to be lower than the valuation v for the strategic buyer (whose
optimal strategy is locally non-losing one for A ∈ CR, see the discussion after [22, Lemma 1]).
This infers Kl+1 < (1 + κ)Nl+1 ≤
⌈
(1 + κ)Nl+1
⌉
=: Nl+1,κ since Nl+1 = l/l+1 by Eq. (5).
Therefore, for the phases l = 1, . . . , L, we have:
v − pl,Kl < (1 + κ)l; v − pl,k < l
(
(1 + κ)Nl − k
) ∀k ∈ ZNl,κ ;
and
Kl−1∑
k=0
(v − pl,k) < l
Nl,κ−2∑
k=0
(
(1 + κ)Nl − k
)
= l
Nl,κ − 1
2
(
2(1 + κ)Nl −Nl,κ + 2
) ≤
≤ l (1 + κ)Nl
2
(
(1 + κ)Nl + 2
)
=
(1 + κ)2
2
Nl ·Nll + (1 + κ)Nll = (1 + κ)
2
2
+ (1 + κ)l−1,
where we used the definitions of Nl and l (i.e., Nll = l−1 and Nl = −1l ), as in the proof of
Theorem 1. For the zeroth phase l = 0, one has trivial bound
∑K0−1
k=0 (v − p0,k) ≤ 1. Hence, by
definition of the exploitation rate g(l), we have
g(l) · l = max{−1l · l, dGγ,κe · l} ≤ max{1, dGγ,κe/2},
and, thus,
Rl ≤ (1 + κ)(2 + κ)
2
+rv+g(l)·(1+κ)l ≤ rv+ (1 + κ)
2
(2+max{2, dGγ,κe}+κ), l = 0, . . . , L−1.
(A.11)
The L-th phase differs from the other ones only in possible absence of some rounds: (reject-
penalization or exploitation ones). In this phase, we consider two cases on the actual number of
exploitation rounds gL(L): (a) gL(L) ≥ dGγ,κe and (b) gL(L) < dGγ,κe. In the case (a), we again
apply Proposition 3 (via Lemma 4 since gL(L) ≥ dGγ,κe) to get that pL,KL < v and the price pL,KL
is thus accepted by the strategic buyer at the exploitation rounds. In this case, we have thus:
RL =
KL−1∑
k=0
(v − pL,k) + rv + gL(L)(v − pL,KL). (A.12)
The right-hand side of Eq. (A.12) is upper-bounded by the right-hand side of Eq. (A.10) with
l = L, which is in turn upper-bounded by the right-hand side of Eq. (A.11). In the case (b), we
have no guarantee that pL,KL < v and, hence, pL,KL may be rejected by the strategic buyer at the
exploitation rounds. Hence, we have to estimate the regret in the last phase in the following way:
RL =
KL−1∑
k=0
(v − pL,k) + rLv + gL(L)v ≤ (1 + κ)(2 + κ)
2
+ (r + dGγ,κe − 1)v, (A.13)
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Figure A.1: The work flow of the Fast Search step: the prices offered at the phases s and s+ 1.
where rL the actual number of reject-penalization rounds, rL ≤ r.
Finally, using (dGγ,κe − 1)v −max{1, dGγ,κe/2} ≤ dGγ,κe/2− 1, one has
SReg(T,A, v,γ) =
L∑
l=0
Rl ≤
(
rv +
(1 + κ)
2
(2 + max{2, dGγ,κe}+ κ)
)
(L+ 1) +
dGγ,κe
2
− 1.
Thus, one needs only to estimate the number of phases L by the number of rounds T . So, for
2 ≤ T ≤ 2+r+g(0), we have L = 0 or 1 and thus L+1 ≤ 2 ≤ log2 log2 T+2. For T ≥ 2+r+g(0), we
have T =
∑L−1
l=0 (Kl+r+g(l))+KL+rL+gL(L) ≥ g(L−1) with L > 0. Hence, 22
L−1 ≤ g(L−1) ≤ T ,
which implies L ≤ log2 log2 T + 1. Summarizing, we get Eq. (8).
B Penalized Reject-Revising Fast Exploiting Search (PRRFES)
The pricing algorithm Penalized Reject-Revising Fast Exploiting Search (PRRFES ) was presented
in [22]. It is a special improvement of the pricing algorithm Fast Exploiting Search (FES ), which was
presented in [22] as well and is in turn a horizon-independent improvement of the pricing algorithm
Fast Search [32] designed to act against a myopic (truthful) buyer with a tight regret bound in
Θ(log log T ). The key peculiarities of PRRFES consist in utilization of penalization rounds after a
rejection, forcing thus the buyer to lie less (similarly to [39]), and in a regular revising of rejected
prices.
Namely, the pricing algorithm PRRFES works in phases initialized by the phase index l := 0,
the last accepted price before the current phase q0 := 0, the iteration parameter 0 := 1/2, and the
number of offers N0 := 2; at each phase l ∈ Z+, it sequentially offers prices pl,k := ql + kl, k ∈ N
(i.e., in contrast to FES, k can now be higher than Nl, thus, it can explore prices higher than the
earlier rejected one pl,Nl = pl−1,Kl−1+1), with l and Nl defined in Eq. (B.1):
l := 
2
l−1 = 2
−2l , Nl := l−1/l = −1l−1 = 2
2l−1 , l ∈ N; (B.1)
if a price pl,k with k = Kl + 1 ≥ 1 is rejected, (1) it offers this price pl,Kl+1 for r − 1 rounds
(penalization: if one of them is accepted, PRRFES continues offering pl,k, k = Kl + 2, .. following
the Definition 5), (2) it offers the price pl,Kl for g(l) rounds (exploitation), and (3) PRRFES goes
to the next phase by setting ql+1 := pl,Kl and l := l+ 1. The pseudo-code of PRRFES is presented
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Algorithm C.1 Pseudo-code of A.
1: Input: A ∈ A
2: Initialize: n := e(T(A)),
3: while the buyer plays do
4: Offer the price pn to the buyer
5: if the buyer accepts the price then
6: n := r(n)
7: else
8: n := l(n)
9: end if
10: end while
Algorithm C.2 Pseudo-code of pre(q,A).
1: Input: q ∈ R and A ∈ A
2: Initialize: n := e(T(A)), p := q
3: while the buyer plays do
4: Offer the price p to the buyer
5: if the buyer accepts the price then
6: p := pn
7: n := r(n)
8: else
9: n := l(n)
10: end if
11: end while
Algorithm C.3 Pseudo-code of the PRRFES [22]
1: Input: r ∈ N and g : Z+ → Z+
2: Initialize: q := 0, p := 1/2, l := 0
3: while the buyer plays do
4: Offer the price p to the buyer
5: if the buyer accepts the price then
6: q := p
7: else
8: Offer the price p to the buyer for r−1 rounds
9: if the buyer accepts one of the prices then
10: go to line 6
11: end if
12: Offer the price q to the buyer for g(l) rounds
13: l := l + 1
14: end if
15: if p < 1 then
16: p := q + 2−2
l
17: end if
18: end while
Algorithm C.4 Pseudo-code of the prePRRFES
1: Input: r ∈ N and g : Z+ → Z+
2: Initialize: q := 0, p := 1/2, l := 0
3: while the buyer plays do
4: Offer the price q to the buyer
5: if the buyer accepts the price then
6: q := p
7: else
8: Offer the price q to the buyer for r− 1 rounds
9: if the buyer accepts one of the prices then
10: go to line 6
11: end if
12: Offer the price q to the buyer for g(l) rounds
13: l := l + 1
14: end if
15: if p < 1 then
16: p := q + 2−2
l
17: end if
18: end while
in Alg. C.3, which is in the class CR (i.e., it is right-consistent) and does not belong to the class
WC (i.e., it is not weakly consistent). In Fig. A.1, we present a scheme of the work flow of the
Fast Search step.
C Pseudo-codes of algorithms
We present pseudo-codes for the following algorithms:
• a general horizon-independent algorithm A in Algorithm C.1
• pre(q,A), a pre-transformation of a general horizon-independent algorithmA in Algorithm C.2;
• PRRFES in Algorithm C.3;
• prePRRFES in Algorithm C.4.
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